

Iwo Amelung (ed.)

Discourses of Weakness in Modern China

Historical Diagnoses of the “Sick Man of East Asia”

Campus Verlag
Frankfurt/New York

The Collaborative Research Center 1095 is funded by the German Research Foundation.

Funded by
DFG Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft
German Research Foundation

ISBN 978-3-593-50902-0 Print
ISBN 978-3-593-43895-5 E-Book (PDF)

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Despite careful control of the content Campus Verlag GmbH cannot be held liable for the content of external links. The content of the linked pages is the sole responsibility of their operators.

Copyright © 2020 Campus Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt-on-Main

Cover design: Campus Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt-on-Main

Printing office and bookbinder: CPI buchbücher.de, Birkach

Printed on acid free paper.

Printed in Germany

www.campus.de

www.press.uchicago.edu

Contents

Introduction	9
<i>Ivo Amelung</i>	

Part I: Examining the Sick Man—Describing Symptoms of Weakness

From Discourse of Weakness to Discourse of Empowerment: The Topos of the “Sick Man of East Asia” in Modern China	25
<i>Jui-sung Yang</i>	

A Two Step Transition 1895–1900. Discourses of Weakness as <i>basso continuo</i> of Chinese Modernity	79
<i>Daniel Hausmann</i>	

Records from a Defeated Country: Different Chinese Narratives about the First Sino-Japanese War (1894/95) and their Spreading during the Last Period of the Qing Dynasty.....	109
<i>Sun Qing</i>	

“Lack of Nation” and “Lack of History”: The Emergence of a Discourse of Weakness in Late Qing China.....	137
<i>Zhang Qing</i>	

Part II: Diagnosing the Sick Man—Divided, Imperilled, Humiliated

The Privileges of the Powerful and the Discourses of the Weak:
The Dissemination and Application of the Concept of
“Extraterritoriality” in Modern China..... 161
Huang Xingtao

Discourses on “National Humiliation” and “National Ruin” as Reflected
in Late Qing and Early Republican Era History Textbooks.....223
Li Fan

The Discourse on “National Humiliation” during the Early
Period of the Chinese Communist Party—The
Case of *The Guide Weekly* (1922–1927).....245
Li Lijeng

The Boundaries of the Chinese Nation: Racism and Militarism
in the 1911 Revolution283
Clemens Büttner

The Idea of “Intellectual Warfare” and the Dispersion of Social Darwinism
in Late Qing China (1897–1906)335
Sebastian Riebold

Part III: Prognosis for the Sick Man—Ruin, Resistance and Restoration

Evolution of the Late Qing Historical Writing on the
Decline of Poland379
Zou Zhenbuan

Selfish Faint Hearts, Ardent Fighters, and Gallant Heroines?—Characters
in Plays about the Taiwan Republic 411
Mirjam Tröster

Progress or Decline: China’s Two Images of India during the
Nineteenth Century465
Zhang Ke

Part IV: Treating the Sick Man—Co-existence, Science and Profit

Nationalism, Human-Co-Existentialism, Pan-Asianism: The Weakness Discourse and Wang Jingwei's Intellectual Transformation.....	489
<i>Zhiyi Yang</i>	
Science and National Salvation in Early Twentieth Century China	519
<i>Iwo Amelung</i>	
Capitalising on Crisis: The Expansion of the Late Qing Newspaper Market.....	565
<i>Tze-ki Hon</i>	
Acknowledgements.....	583
Authors.....	585

Nationalism, Human-Co-Existentialism, Pan-Asianism: The Weakness Discourse and Wang Jingwei's Intellectual Transformation

Zhiyi Yang

Wang Zhaoming 汪兆銘 (1883–1944), better known by his penname as Wang Jingwei 汪精衛, was a man of many faces. His admirers call him a true patriot, who, throughout his life, was driven by a passion to sacrifice himself for the nation. They contend that, under fairer examination, his establishing of a collaborationist regime in Japanese-occupied China during the Second World War was just another form of resistance. His critics, however, saw him as a hypocrite and career opportunist, a man whose treason was the necessary result of his cowardice and defeatism. No other figure in China's recent history has received such polarised judgment. But, as the condemnation has become the standard verdict in mainstream historiography in both China and even abroad, the defence assumes the character of a counter-narrative, breeding on its sense of correcting the historical wrongs inflicted by the victors in the name of the nation.

The criticism of Wang being a political turncoat is well documented. He had been first a nationalist revolutionary who helped to found the Republic only to recede the presidency to Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 (1859–1916), a warlord. Then, he joined the anti-Yuan force when Yuan's monarchist ambition became known. After Sun Yat-sen's (1866–1925) death, he became the leader of KMT (Chinese Nationalist Party) leftwing, and endorsed the policy of working with the Soviets and the CPC (the Communist Party of China). He then turned against the Communists and joined forces with Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 (1887–1975), his chief rival in the KMT. In the face of the invasion of Japan, he first championed resistance before proposing appeasement. And then he escaped Chongqing to negotiate the "peace conditions" with Japan, established a collaborationist regime in Nanjing, and died an ignominious collaborator in a Nagoya hospital in November 1944. In short, his intellectual persuasions, if there were any, appear wildly inconsistent. Yet, despite all these obvious facts, his admirers argue that the truth of a man is not determined by the world's perception of his actions, but by his genuine motivation—and in the case of Wang, it was to save China using all possible means. This view is also supported by a legion of texts, including his own poetry, speeches, writings, and oral or written memoirs by

people who were close to him. The gap between institutionalised and private memories appears unbridgeable.

The case of Wang Jingwei poses a dilemma to historiography. Any effort to reach a facile verdict will be undermined by numerous complex factors which point to other possibilities. I therefore propose to follow Timothy Brook's recommendation to "hesitate before the judgment of history",¹ and aiming instead, as a first step, to examine Wang Jingwei's intellectual transformations without bias, hoping that it may ultimately help to shed light on other complicated aspects of his life. I argue that his intellectual persuasions can be summarised in three stages: Nationalism, Human-Co-Existentialism (his own term, which is, in essence, humanism), and Pan-Asianism. First, he tried to argue that only a Chinese nation dominated by the Han-ethnicity could become a genuine democratic republic, and that national unity and democracy in the form of a republic were both necessary conditions for China's self-strengthening. Then, after a period of sojourn and study in France before and during the First World War, he came to the conclusion that China should be the champion of Human-Co-Existentialism if she wanted to survive at all. Lastly, facing Japan's dominant military force, he tried to convince Japan that peace was in its best self-interest and officially adopted its rhetoric of Pan-Asianism, even though his vision was an Asia united under the principle of national equality and independence. The *leitmotif* underlying all these transformations was his concern with China's perceived national weakness in a Darwinian world dominated by the ruthless principle of the survival of the fittest. Whether the Chinese culture, of which he was the self-designated sentry, had special virtues or was at least unique, and was therefore worthy of preservation, was, for him, a question of existential resonance.

The Young Nationalist as a Hero of the Revolution

Wang Zhaoming was born in Sanshui, Guangdong Province, into an impoverished scholarly family. This coastal region had fought the two Opium Wars (First, 1839–1842; Second, 1856–1860) and had nurtured the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864). Before the rise of Shanghai, it was here that China encountered the West and where the sense of national humiliation was felt most keenly among the educated elites. Many of China's original nationalists hailed from this region. A precocious youth, Wang braced himself through the hardship following the untimely death of both his parents. He went to study in Japan on a

¹ Brook (2012), "Hesitating before the Judgment of History".

Qing government fellowship. After joining the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmenghui 同盟會) under Sun Yat-sen's leadership in Tokyo in 1905, he began to publish polemical essays in their official newspaper *Minbao* 民報 under the penname of Jingwei, the namesake of a mythological bird which carried tiny pebbles in its beak to fill up a raging ocean in order to avenge the latter's claiming its previous life as a little girl.² He won recognition by defending republicanism against the formidable Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929), a democratic reformer who supported constitutional monarchy.

Handsome and eloquent, Wang Jingwei was the revolution's poster child. He became an important fundraiser among the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, a mission that brought him to the acquaintance of his future wife, Chen Bijun 陳璧君 (1891–1959). What really made him a national hero, however, was his failed assassination attempt at the life of the Manchu Prince Regent Zaifeng 載灃 (1883–1951), the father of the last emperor of China. His "Confession" was a powerful essay defending his beliefs. It deeply impressed the enlightened Prince Shanqi 善耆 (1866–1922), who mitigated his death sentence to life imprisonment. The four quatrains that he wrote in prison, "Orally Composed upon Being Captured" ("Beidai kouzhan" 被逮口占), which show his determination to become a martyr for the revolution, became an instant classic in modern Chinese literature.³ He was released in November 1911 after the success of the Wuchang Uprising to broker among the Qing Government, the Nationalists, and Yuan Shikai, who had the *de facto* control of the government's Western-style modern army. The deal he reached was to change China forever.

Wang's most prominent intellectual persuasion during this period was his vehement anti-Manchu nationalism, although this common perception overshadows another side of the equation, namely, his republicanism. In 1905, the nationalists saw their most dangerous enemies not in the conservative forces that refused to change, but in the reformers who supported a constitutional monarchy. Liang Qichao, the intellectual giant of his age, was himself a wanted man in exile in Japan. Nevertheless, he regarded constitutional monarchy to be the best solution to China's problems and the most viable path to democracy. Revolution must rely on violence, he argued, and neither the Chinese people nor Chinese society was quite "ready" for democracy; a thorough and swift dissolution of the current power structures would inevitably lead to political instability, which, in turn, would give rise to plutocracy or dictatorship, or invite foreign intervention.⁴ Liang did see, however, that a constitutional monarchy would eternalise the rule of the Aisin Gioro house, which belonged to an ethnic

² See Yuan Ke (1980), *Shanhaijing jiaozhu*, p. 92.

³ Wang Jingwei (2012a), "Beidai kouzhan" pp. 6–7. For a translation and discussion of these poems, see Yang (2015), "Road to Lyric Martyrdom".

⁴ See Liang Qichao (1905 [1999]), "Kaiming zhuanzhi lun".

minority. It would be legitimised by the constitution and no longer be ordained by the “change of Heaven’s Mandate,” typically manifested through conquest, rebellion, or usurpation. But Liang Qichao did not feel the ethnicity of the royal house to be much of an issue. As he argued, Chineseness is not an ethnic concept, but a cultural concept; just like “barbarians” in the Spring and Autumn period had long been absorbed into the Han Chinese nation, the current distinction between the Manchu and the Han can be easily obliterated once the ban of interracial marriage is lifted and the ethnicities are treated as equal by law.⁵ Liang accepted a racially-based notion of nationalism when it came to China’s future in a Darwinian competition with other nations,⁶ but seemed to lack the anti-Manchu racial resentment. In his view, China was weak not because of the Manchu rule, but mostly because of her national culture, custom, autocratic institutions—all of which had been formed over thousands of years. Recent historical events, for which the dynasty was responsible, also exacerbated the problem, but one primary reason for the national weakness lay precisely in the racial schism between the Manchu and the Han ethnicities.⁷ In other words, the fact that aristocracy was Manchu was only a contingent factor and not the root of the problem, which was the weakness of China’s native Han-ethnic culture; for China’s rejuvenation, it was more urgent to eliminate the racial schism than to re-affirm it by avenging historical wrongs. Liang was not oblivious to the massacres during the Manchu conquest or to the ensuing ethnic division under its rule. But he did suggest that they bury the hatchet and just move on for the greater good.

Members of the Tongmenghui, however, generally followed the lead of Zhang Binglin 章炳麟 (1869–1936; also known as Zhang Taiyan 章太炎), who, at the time, was still in a prison in Shanghai for subversive publications. He would later be released in June 1906, go to Japan, and join the *Minbao* to take charge of its debate against Liang Qichao. Zhang did not accept the philologically shaky argument that Liang Qichao’s mentor Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858–1927) advanced, namely, that the Manchu-ethnicity was historically derived from the Han. And, as he argued, even if it was so, it would not have mattered, since nations are formed through history, not at their origins; the unavenged national trauma was enough to prove their racial difference and perpetuate the racial feud. In terms of revolutionary violence, Zhang cites the examples of the Glorious Revolution in England and the Meiji Reform in Japan to argue that hoping for regime change without the backing of arms is wishful thinking.

5 See Liang Qichao (1896 [1999]), “Lun bianfa bi zi ping Man Han zhi jie shi”, Liang Qichao (1897) [1999], “*Chunqiu Zhongguo Yi Di bian xu*”

6 See Liang Qichao (1902b [1999], “Xinmin shuo”, Section 4, pp. 658–60; Liang Qichao (1902a [1999], “Lun minzu jingzheng zhi dashi”.

7 See Liang Qichao (1900 [1999], “Zhongguo jiru suyuan lun”.

Moreover, if the Han could accept the Manchu rule, what prevents it from accepting another foreign conqueror's rule?⁸ In other words, in order to make the Chinese gather under the banner of nationalism and patriotism, they first need to feel a sense of pride, and this starts with avenging historical humiliations.

From our point of view, both Liang Qichao and Zhang Binglin committed an anachronism in ignoring a crucial historical development, namely, that a modern state requires a different legitimising discourse from a pre-modern one. If blood ties and violence were the two dominant factors empowering a monarch before the era of nation states, nationalism, which rose at the dawn of modernity, requires an alleged "natural" community to legitimise state borders. Admittedly, a state may create an "imagined community"—to use Benedict Anderson's famous coinage⁹—by implementing a series of homogenising cultural and institutional measures. However, this process may be long and often unsuccessful, conditioned by complex historical and political factors. In the face of the actual and deep ethnic fissure running through the fabric of the late Qing society, Liang Qichao's optimism appeared somewhat naïve; while Zhang Binglin's attempt to de-legitimise the Manchu rule based upon a modern doctrine also lacked a historical perspective. Yet, as all modern nations pretend to originate from time immemorial, it seemed easier for most Chinese to imagine a nation dominated by the Han majority than one under a recent minority conqueror.

Zhang's argument in a series of passionate anti-Manchu propagandist articles had offered the emotional keynote to Wang Jingwei's *Minbao* articles, which were typically long, lucid, and well-reasoned. It was in these articles that we first gained a glimpse of Wang's intellectual talent as a propagandist with style. In "Citizens of the Nation" ("Minzu de guomin" 民族的國民), serialised in the first two issues of *Minbao* (Oct./Nov. 1905), he first defined a nation as "a historically continuous group of people sharing the same characteristics," namely, the same blood, same language and script, same region of residence, same habits, same religion(s), and the same spiritual constitutions. This static and essentialist notion of nation was prevalent in late nineteenth and early twentieth century nation-building discourse. Wang then proceeds to clarify that "citizenship" is a legal definition which has two sides: one is the legal duties and rights that define the individual's relation with the state; the other is the freedom and independence that characterise the individual citizen. Thus, only a democracy has citizens, while an autocracy has only slaves. Now, he asks himself: while a "nation" and a "citizenry" are different concepts, could their boundaries be commensurate? He regards a single-ethnicity nation-state the best scenario in

8 Zhang Binglin (1985), "Bo Kang Youwei lun geming shu."

9 See Anderson (1983), *Imagined Communities*.

which to realise equality and freedom among its citizens, but China clearly belongs to the league of multi-ethnicity states. In the latter case, ethnic nationalities co-existing in a state could either remain separated or integrate. If they remain separated, they could either form a union of equal nationalities or let one nationality dominate the others. The second kind spawns racial resentment and is unstable. Integration is a better scenario, and there are four possibilities: 1) equal nationalities integrate into a new nationality; 2) the majority nationality of conquerors absorbs the minority nationalities of conquered peoples; 3) a minority nationality of conquerors absorbs the majority nationality of a conquered people; 4) a minority nationality of conquerors is absorbed by the majority nationality of a conquered people. The constitutional monarchists, in his opinion, had failed to understand the case of China. He cites historical precedence of racial integration from ancient times to prove that China has always been in the second situation, namely, a majority nationality of victorious conquerors absorbing conquered ethnic minorities. Before the Manchu conquest, the only exception was the Mongols, who refused to Sinicise and were ultimately driven out of China. Under the Manchu, however, the Chinese face the danger of being absorbed by a minority nationality. Even though, as Wang admits, racial feud has relented in the recent decades and the Han has started to gain more political power, the ultimate authority is still held in the hands of a Manchu aristocracy. The so-called “constitutional monarchy” is only a trick to eternalise the ethnic hierarchy. Han reformers such as Liang Qichao fail to see it through because they have confused the nationalistic and the democratic revolutions. Racial and the political revolutions, in Wang’s opinion, are different but are both necessary to attain the ultimate goal of building a democratic nation-state. With regard to Liang’s question of whether the Chinese people are “ready” to become modern citizens, Wang replies optimistically that history always moves forward, so the lack of democratic institutions in the past does not prove that nation- and state-building are not possible. On the question of violence, he acknowledges that civil and military powers are at odds, but he is confident that Chinese revolutionaries, under the enlightened leadership of Sun Yat-sen, will be able to “sign a contract” with the Chinese people at the onset of the revolution in order to stipulate each other’s duties and rights. Once a region is liberated, it will organise a representative body to supervise and negotiate with the military government; and, once the revolution succeeds, regional parliaments will unite to replace military rule with a civil government. If the revolutionary military government breaks its contract, the people’s representatives will refuse to fulfil their duties of financial and political support, rendering the country ungovernable.¹⁰

¹⁰ Wang Jingwei (1929), “Minzu de guomin”.

Despite its scientific poise, Wang's argument occasionally takes a flight into romantic passion, especially when it comes to his idealistic moral fervour or his anti-Manchu rage. The fate which he imagines of the Manchu after the success of the revolution betrays strong racial hatred. It never occurred to him to restore the Manchu to their ancestral home and make China a racially pure nation-state. Rather, in his vision, the Manchu would not be able to "escape our axes". The survivors, although deserving to be treated with humanity, are politically too dangerous to be given equal rights; instead, they should be given the legal status of "residential aliens" until they integrate or die out.¹¹ It should be pointed out that this paragraph comes after a long section listing the bloodbath during the Manchu conquest and the subsequent savage literary inquisitions. As modern researchers of trauma may argue, traumatic historical memory can be healed only through a long process of constructive justice, pardon, and reconciliation. The bloodbath of the Manchu conquest, however, was not only never avenged, but was actively prohibited from public commemoration throughout the Qing Dynasty. Literary inquisitions, used as a tool for intellectual control, further institutionalised aphasia, making the comeback of the counter-memory all the more vehement once the ideological control loosened and the Manchu were proven weak in front of the Western powers. The once unassailable conqueror now appeared vulnerable. A proposed re-subjugation to the Manchu monarchy, even a toothless one, stung the sense of Han racial and cultural pride, which was central to the creation of Chinese nationalism with a Han majority. After all, the monarch, even with his power stripped, remained a symbol of the state's political authority and the nation's cultural tradition, and Wang Jingwei and his comrades were not ready to concede the symbolic Chineseness to the erstwhile conqueror. Furthermore, a cynic might also point out that getting rid of the weakened Manchu house was a low hanging fruit for the revolutionaries; modernising China and defending her against colonial powers were more formidable tasks.

National pride rests upon the perception of a nation's uniqueness and strength. Late Qing intellectuals, however, generally accepted the Darwinian principle of "the survival of the fittest". If China is militarily or even culturally weak, does it deserve to live? Wang addressed this issue in another essay published in 1908. He argues that a weak nation does indeed face extinction, which is a universal principle. But the actual situation may grant it some breathing space because the stronger nations are fighting over their rights of dominance, giving it a chance to play and gain time to strengthen itself. A revolution is the best means to inspire the national spirit to seek self-strengthening. Furthermore, the Manchu proved themselves stronger than the Han through its military con-

11 Ibid., p. 22.

quest; he therefore repeats Zhang Binglin's argument that, if the Chinese can live with the Manchu dominance, what prevents them from accepting another foreign ruler?¹² Being a patriot, he had no choice but wishes China the best, although his vision was tinged by Han chauvinism.

It was to stimulate the nation's revolutionary spirit that Wang determined to assassinate the Prince Regent, an action apparently inspired European anarchist activism. He was not alone. Back then, the assassinations of Alexander II of Russia (31 March 1881), of Umberto I of Italy (27 June 1900), and of Alexander I of Serbia (11 June 1903) were broadly relished across progressive newspapers and journals. An article published in the *People's Journal* in 1908 even declared the time as "an Era of Regicide."¹³ In the rising temperature of that parlous time, assassination was seen as a necessary means for revolution and was ardently plotted by men and women itching to add momentum to the country's course of incremental change. Intellectuals with stature no less than Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 (1868–1940), Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀 (1879–1942), and Zhang Shizhao 章士釗 (1883–1971) had participated in one terrorist cell or another. More than fifty assassinations were attempted in the last decade of the Qing dynasty, and assassins, the martyress Qiu Jin 秋瑾 (1875–1907) included, were celebrated across progressive newspapers. Bomb-making methods were broadly shared.¹⁴

Wang Jingwei's attempt, though not an isolated case, was certainly the most notable in capturing the public's imagination, as it was carried by the most high-profile revolutionary. By all accounts, it was a reckless plan, ill-conceived from the start. The five young assassins had no connections in Beijing and little training in explosives, yet they planned to make a bomb undetected in Beijing, bury it underneath the path that the Prince Regent would take, and just hope that it detonated at the right moment in order to kill the Prince. As the Prince rode in a carriage drawn by two horses, the bomb had to be extra-large, too. And if everything miraculously worked out, they did not have an escape plan, as their Cantonese accent would immediately give them away to the police search force. The plan did not work out. The bomb was found and this group of Cantonese-speaking young people quickly became the suspects. Wang, however, decided to stay behind and let himself be caught, in order to realize the other, and perhaps more important, goal of his assassination plot, which was to make himself a

12 Wang Jingwei, "Geming keyi dujue guafen zhi shiju".

13 Jishou (1908), "Diwang ansha zhi shidai". It was ostensibly a translated article. I have yet to identify the original text.

14 On assassinations at the end of the Qing, see for instance Huang Tao (2013), "Yuansha: Qingmo gemingpai ansha yanjiu"; Luo Haoxing (2015), "1900 niandai zhongguo de zhengzhi ansha jiqi shehui xiaoying".

martyr. His sacrifice, so he reasoned, would energise the revolutionary cause while discrediting the Qing reform as insincere.

Here, Wang betrayed the influence of the idealist moral philosophy of the Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529) School of Confucianism, an influence that he had received as a teenager through his father's instruction and which would remain with him throughout his life. In "Determination for Revolution" ("Geming zhi juexin" 革命之決心), an essay published on *Minbao* in February 1910, shortly before his assassination mission, he declared that the determination for revolution derived from one's "empathetic heart" (*ceyin zhi xin* 惻隱之心), a Mencius notion that emphasises the innate origin of moral instincts. Such moral instincts will drive an otherwise gentle soul to attempt the impossible, to perform actions of ultimate courage, in order to save the world.

Thus the most radical means can only be assumed by one with the most peaceful mind; the most steadfast integrity can only be possessed by the one with the most magnanimous temperament.

He cites Wang Yangming's famous epistle to Nie Wenwei 聶文蔚¹⁵ to argue that, if one is absolute honest in applying one's innate "moral knowledge" (*liangzhi* 良知), one will not be deterred by thoughts of wealth, power, or even reputation, in doing the right thing. Such righteous courage will motivate one to be afraid neither of death nor of trouble. Now, the former kind of courage, namely, the courage of martyrdom, is required for the victory of the revolution; while the latter, namely, the courage of bearing the quotidian burden, is for state-building after the victory. The martyr is like firewood, while the statesman is like the pot that endures heat - both are necessary to cook the rice to feed the hungry mass.¹⁶

Wang Jingwei used the same set of metaphors in a private letter to Hu Hanmin 胡漢民 (1879–1936), a fellow leader of the Tongmenghui, written before he launched the mission of no return to Beijing. In this letter, he specifically wished Hu to be the pot while he would be the firewood.¹⁷ This trope also became a recurring theme in Wang's poetry. It first appears in a poem written in 1910 in prison, allegedly upon seeing a worker chopping a worn wooden wheel into pieces; as I doubt that such a scene was likely to be spotted in a heavily guarded prison, it might be an imagined or recollected occasion for the poem. To Wang, this wooden wheel personifies the qualities of endurance and sacrifice; becoming firewood would be its final use, which is to cook newly harvested rice and feed people with warm food.¹⁸ In 1912, after being released

15 See Wang Yangming (2000), *Yangming chuanxi lu*, pp. 248–52.

16 Wang Jingwei (1929b), "Geming zhi juexin".

17 Wang Jingwei (1929f), "Yu Hu Hanmin shu".

18 Wang Jingwei (2012c), "Jian ren xi chelun wei xin wei zuo ci ge", p. 22.

from prison, he decided to go to study in France. Upon crossing the Indian Ocean, Wang wrote two poems lamenting the restless journey of life; yet “if this piece of firewood can still be burnt, / I shall not regret myself becoming cold ashes” 勞薪如可爇，未敢惜寒灰.¹⁹ And, almost thirty years later in Nanjing, when his collaboration with the Japanese had led to his being declared a national traitor, Chen Bijun wrote a calligraphic scroll for him which bore Wang’s four prison quatrains as well as the aforementioned epistle to Nie Wenwei. This scroll was possibly meant to encourage Wang not to forget his initial resolution to care solely about saving the Chinese people, and not think about his personal reputation. Wang was inspired to re-use the firewood image, reassuring in a poem that “what I expect to be is not the pot but the firewood” 不望為釜望為薪.²⁰

Certainly, one’s self-image does not mean the truth, nor does altruistic motivation translate into good or even wise deeds. But the consistency in Wang’s rhetoric suggests a strong sense of moral subjectivity. Wang envisioned himself as being responsible to China’s elite cultural tradition and to a vaguely-defined nation consisting of an anonymous mass. His moral agency is thus both temporal and spatial, set to extend an idealistic Confucian statecraft, with every practical means available, over a land populated by people whom he determined to love, but never came to personally know.

Not that the Chineseness of this anonymous people mattered. Rather, Wang, in disposition, was a man living in the abstract, and his being a Han Chinese was only contingent. His anti-Manchu rage had already appeared to dissipate when he wrote the “Confession” in the Manchu prison. There, he focuses mainly on the democratic revolution, and proposes that people of different ethnicities should all be treated equal in the future Republic of China.²¹ It is possible that the heroic action of assassination was a cathartic moment that released his pent-up wrath, accumulated through reliving the nation’s historical trauma in the fervent imaginations of a young revolutionary. In any case, after the victory of the 1911 Revolution, Wang shifted towards cosmopolitanism and humanism with determination.

A Humanist in France

November 1918, the First World War ended. Despite the fact that China had declared war on the Central Powers on 14 August 1917, Japan claimed its right

¹⁹ Wang Jingwei (2012d), “Yinduyang zhou zhong”, p. 44.

²⁰ Wang Jingwei (2012b), “Bingru shoushu Yangming xiansheng ‘Da Nie Wenwei shu’ [...]”.

²¹ Cited in Zhang Jiangcai (1937), “Wang Jingwei xianshen gengxu mengnan shilu”.

to the German colony in the Shandong Province, which it had seized in November 1914, and the Allies decided to concede to its demands. Amid the domestic protest in China, of which the most famous incident was known as the May Fourth Movement, the Treaty of Versailles was signed on 28 June 1919.

Wang Jingwei observed the ravages of the war closely from France.²² After the foundation of the Republic, he was offered top government positions, including Governor of Guangdong. Following his anarchist persuasion, however, he declined all job offers and declared that he would continue his studies in Europe, following the steps of his senior friends and mentors Wu Zhihui 吳稚暉 (1865–1953), Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 (1868–1940), and Li Shizeng 李石曾 (1881–1973). He wanted to become an educator and enlighten the Chinese people, improve their moral character, and make them modern citizens. Supported by a generous government stipend, he took departure in August 1912, accompanied by his loyal comrade and newly-wed wife, Chen Bijun, and by their best friend Fang Junying 方君瑛 (1884–1923) and her widowed sister-in-law Zeng Xing 曾醒 (1882–1954). The four young adults further brought with them four children: Fang Junying's sister Junbi 方君璧 (1898–1986), Zeng Xing's brother Zhongming 曾仲鳴 (1896–1939), her son Fang Xianshu 方賢俶 (1900–?), and Bijun's brother Changzu 陳昌祖 (1904–1994). Cantonese was their common tongue. This small group, bounded by blood ties, friendship, and idealism, would in later years become Wang's most faithful coterie of supporters, separable only by death. They first arrived at Montargis, a quiet small town close to Paris. After the war broke out they decided to leave Montargis, probably thinking it was too close to Paris. They moved first to Nantes and eventually to Laon. Though the town fell in September 1914, a few Chinese behind the Western Front did not seem to attract too much attention. When winter came the group migrated south. In November they made their way to Toulouse, where Cai Yuanpei and Li Shizeng already found refuge. They would eventually live in Royan and finally in Bordeaux, where some young adults of his group would study at the university.

Wang and Chen's first two children were born during this period. His plan to study, however, was frequently interrupted by China's domestic crises. He was summoned by Sun Yat-sen a few times to join the anti-Yuan movements and spent lengthy periods in China, which invariably ended with his regret for having achieved nothing and returning once again to France. Furthermore, his resolution was hobbled by his lack of talent in foreign languages. His French never reached the proficiency required for the entrance exam to any French

²² Wang's life in France has previously received no scholarly attention. Many crucial facts remain vague. I have reconstructed this period of his life in detail in another article: Zhiyi Yang (2018), "A Humanist in Wartime France: Wang Jingwei during the First World War."

university.²³ He did, however, manage to promote Chinese-language publishing and education in France, together with Wu, Cai, and Li. They founded and raised funds for the *Société Franco-Chinoise d'Education* (*Hua Fa jiaoyuhui* 華法教育會), promoted the Diligent Work-Frugal Study programme (*qingong jianxue* 勤工儉學), and founded the *Study in Europe* magazine (*Lü Ou zazhi* 旅歐雜誌). The *L'institut Franco-chinois de Lyon* (Li'ang Zhongfa Daxue 里昂中法大學) which he co-founded in 1921 on his return to China was to become the centre of a network of Chinese students' coming to Europe, especially France. Previously, Chinese students' primary destination for overseas education was Japan, as it was cheap, close to home, and similar in culture; those supported by fellowships or by family funds could afford to go to America. Wang and his fellow educators' endeavours would make France a popular destination for ambitious and less affluent students. These students' work-study life would further help them to forge camaraderie with labourers. They would later bring back to China not only modern science, art, and philosophy, but also Marxist idealism. Many future CPC leaders, including Zhou Enlai 周恩來 (1898–1976) and Deng Xiaoping 鄧小平 (1904–1997), participated in this programme and received their intellectual initiation in France.²⁴

Wang was deeply frustrated by his lack of progress in studying European philosophy and literature. A few private epistles addressed to Wu Zhihui, now in the KMT Party Archives in Taipei, reveal his agonies. In a letter dated May 13 [1914?],²⁵ he expresses a wish to find out what he was to do with the rest of his life; he mentions Wu Zhihui's suggestion that, now that it was no longer possible for him to become a philosopher, perhaps he should dedicate himself to literature; Wang heartily agrees and promises to focus on reading and writing for the next few years.²⁶ Another letter dated to January 16 [1916] calls his negotiation in China to prevent the monarchy of Yuan Shikai "ineffective"; deeply frustrated, he vowed that he would finally commit himself to his studies and would never return to China again; even if China "should perish" (original word: *wanguo* 亡國, although its meaning remains unclear; either it means the restoration of the monarchy or foreign invasion), he would choose to commit

23 Many biographers mistakenly write that Wang studied sociology at the University of Lyon. My own research at Lyon Municipal Archive and Fonds Chinois Archive suggests that he might have never lived in Lyon and certainly never registered at the university. It is possible that it was the official reason of continuing to grant him the government fellowship, since if one did not register in a university in time the government would withdraw its support. But, given Wang's prestige and rank in the Party, we may not expect the rules to have been observed strictly in his case. Further research is needed to find out how the story of his studying sociology in Lyon began to circulate.

24 See Xian Yuhao (2016), *Liu Fa qingong jianxue yundong shi*.

25 Wang Jingwei's private epistles are typically dated only with month and day, but not with the year. The years provided here are my own reconstructions.

26 Wang Jingwei's letter to Wu Zhihui, Document "Zhi 稚 07595," KMT Party Archive, Taipei.

suicide facing the east, rather than returning home.²⁷ Another letter, dated March 21 [1916], mentions his attempt to assassinate Yuan Shikai when he was in Shanghai, but Yuan, suspecting his motive, declined to meet him. Wang even contemplated on fantastical measures to approach Yuan, such as changing one's appearance—he had read about it in detective novels, but the means he learned from a drama teacher in Paris were far less spectacular. He feels as though he is trapped in a deep existential dilemma: the purpose of his studies is, metaphorically, to melt a “hammer” (soldier) and remake it into a “saw” (educator), but, in the process of transformation, he has neither the use of a saw nor that of a hammer; even when he tries to pick up the old trade of his *Minbao* period to write polemical articles, he has no reference to rely on, as reading in Japanese (heavily peppered with Chinese characters) was easy, while reading in Western languages was beyond him. Tormented by these thoughts, he lost sleep and appetite and suffered from neurosis.²⁸ It was his frustration in his studies and his desire to leave a mark in history, I surmise, that finally drove Wang back to China to return to politics, relinquishing his resolutions and risking the reprimands of his friends of “losing the qualification to be a master of New China”, to wit, making himself a Western-educated modern intellectual.²⁹

Yet, Wang's sojourn in France did yield intellectual progress. At first, his nationalist passion weakened, and he was attracted by anarchism, of which Wu Zihui was an adamant advocator. The outbreak of the First World War, however, shook both beliefs. Anarchism now seemed utopian, while narrow national self-interest, as represented by the viral brand of militarism developed in late nineteenth century Germany, resulted in unprecedented disasters. And, ending his French sojourn, he took the route through Siberia in early 1917 on his way back to China and saw the brewing Soviet revolution first-hand, which further helped him to look beyond China and think in terms of global challenges and world peace. In December 1918, the Guangdong Military Government elected him their representative to the appending Paris Peace Conference, to be held the following January, on the grounds that Wang was familiar with international politics and was a senior leader of the Nationalist Party (at the time still called the Chinese Revolutionary Party 中華革命黨). Wang declined the appointment, even though he did go to Paris as a private observer of the conference. The major reason he cited was his lingering attachment to anarchism. Another unstated reason, I suspect, was that as a centrist he did not want to represent a separatist regional government and therefore undermine the diplomatic effort of China's Central Government.

27 Wang Jingwei's letter to Wu Zihui, Document “Zhi 09385,” KMT Party Archive, Taipei.

28 Wang Jingwei's letter to Wu Zihui, Document “Zhi 09381,” KMT Party Archive, Taipei.

29 Cai Yuanpei's letter to Wu Zihui, Document “Zhi 07810,” KMT Party Archive, Taipei.

What he saw at the conference was a game of power, a reckless disregard for international justice or for China's rights. He joined the protest against the signing of the treaty, a popular demand to which the Chinese representative yielded. Two months later, in August 1919, Wang Jingwei, still in France, joined Sun Yat-sen's *Construction Monthly* (*Jianshe yuekan* 建設月刊), a journal published in Shanghai, as its chief writer. "The Co-existence of Humanity" ("Renlei zhi gongcun" 人類之共存) and "The Paris Peace Conference and the Sino-Japanese Problem" ("Bali Hehui yu Zhong Ri wenti" 巴黎和會與中日問題) were two long essays first published in this journal. Both essays were collected in an anthology entitled *China and the World after the Paris Peace Conference* (*Bali Heyi hou zhi shijie yu Zhongguo* 巴黎和議後之世界與中國), edited by Wang Jingwei and published in 1920. The title of the first article was slightly modified to become "Human-Co-Existentialism" ("Renlei gongcun zhuyi" 人類共存主義) as the preface of the anthology. The change in the title indicates a sense of its theoretical importance.

"Human-Co-Existentialism," is, in my opinion, the representative piece of Wang Jingwei's mature thoughts after the long period of his studies, observation, and thinking in France. It begins by declaring the basic principles of human co-existence, namely, that everyone should think for his or her own existence and care about the existence of others. For one's own individual existence, the most important values are independence and freedom; while, for the society, they are the divisions of labour and collaboration. Given the limit of man's existential horizon, his sense of existence expands over time. In a primitive society, it was about his individual existence; then it expanded to the existence of the family, and then to tribal existence; in the age of the nation-state, it expands to national existence; and, in a globalised world, the notion of human co-existence should arise by necessity.

Wang Jingwei then assumes the voice of a Darwinian interlocutor who challenges his vision and argues that all living creatures are dominated by the "survival of the fittest" principle, and that man should be no exception. Wang answers by distinguishing positive competition and negative competition. In the scenario of positive competition, both parties improve their skills to win a competitive edge, and, as a result, the technological level of production is improved. In the scenario of negative competition, however, the parties try to undermine each other, resulting in mutual destruction. On the societal level, negative competition would be militarism, which, in Wang Jingwei's words, is represented by the theories of "German scholars" and sees war as the necessary means of evolution. Wang Jingwei does not explicitly mention the First World War as the result of such a Social Darwinian philosophy, but readers, in 1919, would have no difficulty in deducing that conclusion.

Wang then proceeds to argue that evolution postulates not only competition but also collaboration. All animals have two kinds of fundamental desires: the nutritive and the reproductive; the former leads to competition, and the latter to collaboration.³⁰ Even though internal collaboration may be used as a means of competition among human groups, collaboration itself also derives from a fundamental human desire and is not just a means but also an end. Moreover, there are no constant winners or losers in a negative competition for resources. So, if the social production improves to the extent that everyone will be nourished, collaboration is certainly more beneficial than negative competition.

Lastly, men are different from animals since they can make self-conscious choices. So we should be able to transcend our basest desires, abandon negative competition, and aspire for positive competition and collaboration. This, Wang Jingwei argues, establishes the theoretical foundation of his Human-Co-Existentialism.

His interlocutor then questions whether such an ideal is impractical in today's world. Wang answers that, though the League of Nations is imperfect, it is, after all, the germane point of international collaboration, a development in the right direction. As for the opinion that this ideal is too lofty for China, since China could hardly protect her own existence, let alone take care of the human co-existence, Wang replies that, it is precisely *because* of China's weakness that she should promote Human Co-Existentialism. First, in the situation of actual inequality, the weak parties could either be eliminated or be improved to attain equality. The contact of China with the rest of the world has brought both kinds of possibilities for China. If militarism and colonialism threaten to eliminate her existence, the spread of Western science gives her hope to improve herself in both material and spiritual lives.

The second point that Wang raises is of particular interest. He declares that equality should be understood not only as the equality of rights but also as equality in responsibilities. Those who claim equal rights without fulfilling their responsibilities do not deserve these rights; those who have fulfilled their responsibilities but do not receive equal rights can call it injustice. Now, China has not fulfilled its responsibilities to become equal with civilised countries in building political and social institutions or in enlightening her population. So, when countries like Italy or Japan refuse to return those rights, they could raise actual evidence to claim that China would not take care of the material equipment or social institutions in these former colonies. This sorry state of affairs should remind China how much she has degenerated from her former cultural glories. So, in order to aspire to equal rights, China should fulfil her share of

30 Here I fear that Wang's biological reasoning is a bit mangled, since reproductive desire can also lead to competition, as anyone who has seen a group of primates in a zoo suspects.

responsibilities towards self-improvement. This argument that the weak are complicit in their own demise will be explored below.

The enemy of Human Co-Existentialism, in Wang's opinion, is primarily militarism, represented by Germany. The First World War shows that German militarism cannot be defeated by Russia, which was a similarly militarised country, but can be defeated by democratic and liberal countries such as France and the USA, which promote justice and science among their people, who, in consequence, have something to fight for. Wang's conclusion is that human independence relies upon justice and not upon violence, and that the best defence against aggression is in promoting knowledge and learning, not in military force. In this sense, Wang regards the Paris Peace Conference as a transitive point from the era of militarism to the era of Human Co-Existentialism.

Despite China's perceived weakness and the urgent existential crisis posed by the jingoistic ambition of Japan, on which he offers a capable and comprehensive analysis in the following essay, entitled "The Paris Peace Conference and Sino-Japan Problem", Wang's optimism in this essay is quite striking. He believes that 1919 marks the end of the era of militarist Social Darwinism. As he has previously argued in an essay entitled "The Meaning of Sacrifice" ("Xisheng de yiyi" 犧牲的意義), published in August 1916 (*Li Ou zazhi*, no.1), weakness and strength change over time, and nations develop at uneven speeds. A currently weak nation or civilisation could erupt in the future as a strong one. Social Darwinism, however, regards the process of evolution as lineal, and therefore ignores the reality of uneven development and eliminates the possibilities of catching-up. Second, a global society that develops in the Social Darwinian vision would see cultural diversity reduced, leading to the dominance of a single culture, a single race, or a single person. Thus, the "survival of the fittest" doctrine would become its own enemy, ultimately eliminating competition all together. Wang therefore regards himself to be a humanist (*rendao zhuyi zhe* 人道主義者), as Darwinian competition could exist among animals or between humans and animals, but not among men.

This period shows the evolution in Wang's ongoing reflection on the weakness of China. For the young Wang Jingwei, devoted to the anti-Manchu nationalist revolution, "weakness" was simply the declined state of the Chinese nation which was to be overcome by revolution (as shown in his earlier writings). During his stay in France, and especially since the outbreak of the First World War, however, he began to reflect more on the ethical dimension of "weakness". A poem written perhaps in late 1914, entitled "A Translation of De Florian's Fable" ("Yi Folaoliang yuyanshi" 譯佛老里昂寓言詩),³¹ was inspired by the French poet Jean-Pierre Claris de Florian's (1755–1794) fable "La Brebis

31 Wang Jingwei (2012), *Shuangzhaolou shici gao*, p. 53. The whole poem is translated in Zhiyi Yang (2018), "A Humanist in Wartime France".

et le Chien” (“The Lamb and the Dog”). De Florian’s fable depicts a lamb and a dog lamenting their miserable fates of being enslaved or eaten by the humans; yet, as the dog argues at the end, it is better to suffer than to cause suffering.³² De Florian’s original poem is rather short and simple, Wang Jingwei’s pentasyllabic ancient-style verse, however, is much longer and more elaborate. In De Florian’s poem, the dog says:

... mais crois-tu plus heureux
 Les auteurs de notre misère?
 Va, ma soeur, il vaut encore mieux
 Souffrir le mal que de le faire.

(But do you believe him to be happier—/ the authors of our misery? / Go, my sister, it is better / to suffer evil than inflict it.)

Wang creatively adapts it to:

弱者未云禍 Weakness leads not necessarily to misfortune,
 強者未云福 And strength is not necessarily luck.
 與其作刀俎 Compared to being the knife or the cutting board,
 毋寧為魚肉 We’d rather be the fish to be gutted, the meat to be cut.

If the morale of De Florian’s poem is a pious discussion of Christian happiness, a mental state that is easier to achieve when one has a clear conscience, even while being the victim of evil, Wang’s adaptation shifts the focus to weakness. The first two lines relate the current discussion on weakness to Laozi’s doctrine on the dialectics of misfortune and fortune (“In misfortune fortune lies; in fortune misfortune lies” 禍兮福所倚福兮禍所伏; *Laozi* 58). Thus, when saying that weakness does not necessarily lead to misfortune, he also implies that weakness could one day become strength. The next two lines transform the saying: “Now others are the knife and cutting board, while we are the fish and the meat” 方今人為刀俎我為魚肉, meaning a situation in which one is under total manipulation and in mortal danger.³³ Wang’s adaptation is close to De Florian’s in spirit, but he takes away the element of “happiness” entirely. Instead, he presents an image of the weak literally being the food for the consumption of the powerful. This image ties to his comment following the poem, in which he uses the term *ruorou qiangshi* 弱肉強食 (literally, “the meat of the weak is the fodder of the strong”) which is the translation of the Darwinian doctrine of the “survival of the fittest” by Yan Fu 嚴復 (1854–1921), in order to discuss the issue between the weak and the strong:

32 See de Florian (1855), *Fables de Florian*, Paris: Delarue, p. 37.

33 See Sima Qian (1959), “Xiang Yu benji” 項羽本紀 (Basic annals of Xiang Yu), in *Shiji*, vol. 1, p. 314.

佛氏此詩，天下之自命為強者皆當愧死。顧吾以為弱肉強食，強者固有罪矣，即弱者亦不為無罪。罪惡之所以存於天地，以有施者即有受者也。苟無受者，將於何施？是又願天下之自承為弱者一思之也。

Reading this poem of De Florian's, all those who regard themselves as strong powers in the world should be mortally ashamed. In my opinion, in the scenario of the so-called "the meat of the weak is the fodder of the strong", though the strong have the sin, the weak share the sin too. The reason that sin and evil exist between the heaven and the earth is because there are always two parties involved, the doer and the receiver. Without a receiver, who can be the doer? This is what I would like those who admit themselves to be the weak to think about.

This colophon further complicates the relation between weakness and strength. Wang seems to say that, though the strong commit the crime of murder, the weak are complicit in this crime, a point which, as we have seen earlier, specifically refers to China's predicament. Thus, the lesson is neither to stay weak, nor to perpetuate the cycle of sin. In this poem, Wang has not offered an answer to how to break the cycle. From this poem in 1914 to the 1916 essay entitled "The Meaning of Sacrifice" and finally to the resolute proposal of a Human-Co-Existentialism in 1919, we see Wang's continuous reflection on this issue. The weak are perhaps guilty of their own victimhood, but it is also ethically more preferable than being the bully who denies others their right to exist. Ultimately, the answer lies in a humanist spirit applied to international relations. Wang wants the post-war world to share his paradigm of peaceful co-existence and positive competition. Japan's encroachment of China's territory, therefore, is not just an existential threat to China, but also a grave enemy of this emerging new global order.

Interlude: Wang Jingwei and Communism

Wang Jingwei was attracted to Communism by its promise of the liberation of the workers and world unity. Such a vision appeals to his humanist disposition. The First United Front, an alliance between the KMT and the CPC formed in 1923, was a marriage of convenience. The CPC needed a holding to survive, while KMT needed the Soviet assistance to fight the warlords who filled the power vacuum left by Yuan Shikai's untimely death. As a result, the CPC members would join the KMT while still retaining their dual-party membership; the KMT received arms, training, and military consultancy from the Soviet Union. Yet, ideologically, the later Sun Yat-sen did share many of the Communists' ideas, especially in his economic policy. In a series of speeches that he gave in 1924 towards the end of his life, to re-elaborate upon his "Three Principles of the People" (*sanmin zhuyi* 三民主義), he declared: "The Principle of the Peo-

ple's Livelihood is simply socialism, namely, communism, or the Principle of the Great Unity" 民生主義就是社會主義，又名共產主義，即是大同主義。³⁴ But Sun Yat-sen's proposals differed from those of the Soviet Union's in a few important ways. First, he simultaneously emphasised nationalism and democracy, the other two principles of the triad. Second, he was against violent confiscation of land, and proposed, instead, a gentler and incremental path towards land reform, namely, the state was first to evaluate the price of land, and give the current owners a fixed price, so that, when the land price increases together with enhanced productivity, the original owner would only hold the amount of land corresponding to the original fixed value, while the land which amounted to the increased value would be confiscated and re-distributed. Clearly, no one found the proposal satisfactory: the landowners felt threatened, while the peasants, in dire destitution, could not wait.

After Sun Yat-sen's death on 12 March 1925, Wang Jingwei was broadly viewed as the successor of his political legacy. Having eventually relinquished his allegiance to anarchism, on July 3, 1925, he would be elected President of China by the Nationalist Government in Guangzhou. It was true that Wang ghost-wrote Sun's last will when the latter lay dying in Beijing. Wang's supporters elaborated the story into a myth of transmission, which evokes the "transmission of the dharma" mythology in Buddhist hagiography. Wang styled himself in this way too. In a speech given at the one-year anniversary of Sun's death, Wang summarised that Sun had left two tasks to his comrades, namely, to work together with the Soviets and to unite with various factions of the revolutionaries.³⁵ In another speech, he emphatically declared that, to realise nationalism and democracy, the KMT must awaken the common people, including the workers and the farmers, and must work together with "other nations that treat us as equal", namely, the Soviet Union.³⁶ One may suspect that Wang was eager to cast himself as Sun's successor in order to grab more power among the KMT ranks, especially against his rivals, such as Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Hanmin. Such suspicion may contain a grain of truth, but Wang's conviction as well as his friendship with leading Communists seemed genuine. More than just a working relationship, he and Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀 (1879–1942) forged a bond based upon mutual respect of each other's intellectual calibre. It was also under Wang's patronage that the young Mao Zedong's 毛澤東 (1893–1976) career took off.

In March 1927, when the Generalissimo began to purge the Communists from KMT, wary of its increasing influence, Wang took the Communists under his wing. He called Chiang an autocrat, who exploited the pretext of "putting

34 Sun Yat-sen (1981), "Sanmin zhuyi, minsheng zhuyi".

35 Wang Jingwei (1927), "Zenyangde jinian Zongli yanjiangci".

36 Wang Jingwei (1929e), "Xuanbu Sun Zongli shilue yanjiangci".

the Party in order” to trample upon democratic rights. The KMT regime split into two, with the leftwing gathering in Wuhan under Wang and the rightwing in Nanjing under Chiang. This serious crisis in the party history led some KMT members, including his erstwhile trusted friend Wu Zhihui, to view Wang as a traitor.

However, the Communist land confiscation and violent class-struggle policies eventually upset Wang, and he was reportedly further shocked by the Soviet secret mandate for the CPC to take over the control of the government. The nationalist and democrat in him made a swift decision to re-forge the alliance with Chiang Kai-shek. In September, the antagonism between Wuhan and Nanjing was formally over, and Wang became a resolute anti-Communist. The armed opposition between the KMT and the CPC began, and continued until the Second United Front was established in 1937, in the face of Japan’s aggression.

In a speech given on 5 November 1927, a rueful Wang apologised for having created fractures within the party. He explained his change of heart by first arguing that policies are different from principles—both, he maintained, should be adjusted according to circumstances, but principles are fundamental, while policies are derivative. The policies “uniting with the Soviets, uniting with the Communists, and assisting the farmers and workers”, which Sun Yat-sen advocated in the last stage of his life, were next in importance to the Three Principles of the People. Sun Yat-sen advocated these policies based upon the Soviet promise of assisting the Chinese nationalist revolution and of not promoting the Communist revolution in China. At the same time, there were three different opinions in the Soviet government concerning the United Front: the pro, the con, and Stalin’s faction, which agreed to it only to manipulate the KMT from inside. When he went to Wuhan, he began to have second thoughts about the Communists’ actions. The Comintern representative Manabendra Nath Roy (1887–1954), however, trusted him enough to show him a resolution from Moscow to confiscate land, reform the KMT Central Executive Committee, arm the party members, and set up “revolutionary tribunals”. Wang hereby realised that the two parties were going in different directions, and decided to turn resolutely against the Communists.³⁷

This, at least, was Wang’s explanation for his change of heart. The mainstream narrative of mainland Chinese historiography offers another interpretation. It is believed that Wang exploited the Communists when he needed them in a power play against Chiang Kai-shek, and betrayed them once he realised that his interests were aligned with the class of the landlords and capitalists, not with the proletariat. According to this narrative, Wang was an opportunist and a

³⁷ Wang Jingwei (1929d), “Wuhan fengong zhi jingguo”.

traitor. In whichever case, from 1927, Wang's aversion against Communism seemed to have even outstripped that of Chiang Kai-shek's. After Chiang signed the agreement to forge a Second United Front as a result of the *coup d'état* known as the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, Wang became a strong dissenter against the union. He believed the Communists to be *provocateurs* who were trying to create friction between Japan and China, while peddling the propaganda of "united armed resistance" to exploit the public's patriotic sentiments, solely for the purpose of their own survival and expansion. (The Communists, both then and now, believe that it was all a political show to wrestle power from Chiang.) As Wang and his followers would later point out, from 1937 to 1938, Wang was the chief negotiator with Japan whenever the latter initiated a new act of aggression, but he could gain nothing on the table when the generals were not delivering on the battlefield. Wang was convinced that, barring a miracle, China could not possibly win against industrialised Japan, although Japan could not sustain a prolonged war, either. Turning to the reasonable factions on both sides, he hoped for a peaceful solution, and eventually decided to do it in his own way. His desperate solution was to work with the enemy. Whatever his motivation was, in December 1938, Wang responded to the Konoe cabinet's "Declaration of a New Order in East Asia", by fleeing from Chongqing to Hanoi to initiate a "Peace Movement", and eventually decided to collaborate with Japan and found a regime in Nanjing.

One Bed, Two Dreams: Wang Jingwei as a Pan-Asianist

The genuine intellectual persuasion of Wang Jingwei in the last ignominious period of his life is hard to determine, not least because the archives at Nanjing relating to him and his regime are closed to researchers. His official pronouncement, however, endorsed Japan's wartime propaganda of Pan-Asianism (Jp. *ajia shugi* アジア主義; Ch. *da Yazhou zhuyi* 大亞洲主義). Yet, a closer look reveals an effort to re-define his puppet-master's rhetoric in substance and in purpose.

Hannah Arendt, in her classic study on the origin of totalitarianism, argues that Pan-Movements in Europe that began in the late nineteenth century were the forerunners of totalitarianism, that "Nazism and Bolshevism owe more to Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism (respectively) than to any other ideology or political movement."³⁸ Unlike early imperialism, they were marked by lack of interest in economics and were led by the intelligentsia rather than capitalists,

38 Arendt (1951), *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, p.290.

held together more by a general mood than clearly-defined aims. To create that emotional center, however, the Pan-Movements needed to evoke an aura of holiness inherited from the past. “Pseudomystical nonsense, enriched by countless and arbitrary historical memories, provided an emotional appeal that seemed to transcend, in depth and breadth, the limitations of nationalism.”³⁹

In comparison, Pan-Asianism bore many similarities but also notable differences to its European counterparts. It was a theory that first appeared in late nineteenth century Japan to promote the regional co-operation of Asiatic peoples against Western colonial powers. Compared to the traditional Sinocentric East Asian order, it appeared to be a more modern ideology that liberally borrowed nationalistic rhetoric to serve as an integrating force, helping to fulfil the requirement for the “de-centring of China”.⁴⁰ On the other hand, the Sino-centric hierarchic view of the world also encouraged some Japanese Pan-Asianists to envision a new East Asia with a new Middle Kingdom, which was to be Japan. As early as 1910, the discourse of Pan-Asianism was used by the Japanese government to legitimise Japan’s annexation of Korea.⁴¹ In the Second World War, Japan used it as propaganda to justify its aggression in Asia as liberating the Asian nations from the shackles of Western imperialism. This discursive system, however, was centred mostly on anti-colonialism by awakened Asian races, rather than on the imagined unity or holiness of a united Asian Race. And despite that it buttressed Japan’s jingoistic aggressions in Asia, it never developed into the kind of full-scale, ideologically-based totalitarianism that ravaged Pan-Slavic and Pan-German circles.

But the rhetoric of equality and “co-prosperity”, although a tool to disguise Japan’s ambition of dominance, was important for the puppet regimes to justify themselves to their people. Wang’s regime at Nanjing, formally called the Reorganised National Government (RNG), struggled to maintain an appearance of sovereignty. The RNG continued to adopt the formal trappings of the KMT national government, including using the same national flag and official insignia—much to the displeasure of Japan, as they protested that these symbols created confusion for their soldiers on the battlefield. The RNG also enhanced the aura of Sun Yat-sen as the nation’s founder, and then tried to establish Wang as Sun’s appointed successor. Previously, during Wang’s honeymoon with the Communists, he had already portrayed it as succeeding Sun’s policy of Soviet alliance. Now, he strived to establish his collaboration upon Sun’s vision of Pan-Asianism.

39 Ibid., p. 295.

40 Saaler. Sven and Christopher W. A. Szpilman (2011), *Pan-Asianism: A Documented History*, vol. 1, p.9.

41 Ibid., vol.1, p.10.

Sun promoted this vision in a speech given at Kobe during his last trip to Japan, a mere four months before his death, with opportune timing that endorsed Wang's claim of it to be part of Sun's final legacy. In this speech, Sun Yat-sen hoped that all colonial or semi-colonial Asian countries would follow the example of Japan in strengthening themselves and abolishing unequal treaties. Japan's naval victory over Russia, furthermore, inspired all other Asian nations for their own independence. Sun suggests that the European culture adores the Despotic Way 霸道 (Ch. *badao*; Jp. *badō*), while Asian culture is that of the Kingly Way 王道 (Ch. *Wangdao*; Jp. *ōdō*) - namely, the European way rules through force, utilitarianism, and suppression, while the Asian way rules through benevolence, justice, and morality. Such Confucian values should consequently be the basis of Pan-Asianism—a view that betrays his Sinocentric cultural perspective. So, if Asian countries learn to improve their science, industry, and weaponry from Europe, the goal is not conquest but self-defence. Japan, as the best student of Europe in building its industrial strength and military force, should unite with all other Asian countries in a struggle against the European Despotic Way. Right now, as Sun announced emphatically at the end of his speech, Japan stands at the crossroad between the Despotic Way and the Kingly Way, and it should choose very carefully.⁴²

Sun's Kobe address received wide coverage in Japan at the time, though some newspapers redacted his closing note of warning. Ironically, his urging Japan to choose the Kingly Way was appropriated by Japanese chauvinism as well. In the 1930s and 1940s, Japan often proclaimed its rule in Manchukuo as the Kingly Way and further used it to legitimise an “Asian Monroe Doctrine” and a “holy war” against China.⁴³ According to Hiranuma Kiichirō (1867–1952), Prime Minister from January to August 1939, it was Japan's heaven-mandated duty, sparing neither “lives” nor “money”, to save the de-generated China from herself.⁴⁴ Using the Confucian moralistic discourse, conquest was translated into salvation.

Sun's vision of Pan-Asianism bore significant affinity to Wang's Human-Co-Existentialism—we just need to shrink Wang's lofty vision for the whole of humanity to the scope of Asia. Yet, it takes quite a bit of rhetorical acrobatics for Wang to proclaim equality between Japan and China in their unholy alliance, a quixotic claim, he insists, much to the chagrin of domestic and international observers. The *New York Times* (31 March 1940) reports his inaugural speech when his regime was founded in Nanjing the previous day under the title “Equality is Claimed”:

42 Sun Yat-sen (1981), “Dui Shenhu shangyehuiyisuo deng tuanti de yanshuo”.

43 Saaler, Sven and Christopher W. A. Szpilman (2011), *Pan-Asianism: A Documented History*, vol. 2, pp. 77–78.

44 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 195

All policies adopted, all laws or decrees running counter to these declared policies will be abolished or amended so that our sovereign independence and territorial integrity may be safeguarded and that reciprocal, equal economic co-operation may be realised in order to lay the foundations for our co-existence and joint prosperity. With this readjustment made, China and Japan, like two brothers reconciled after an unfortunate resort to arms, will be everlastingly at peace and will jointly stabilise East Asia.

The same policy of peace by diplomacy will also be applied to all friendly powers.

The same points were stressed at a press reception after the inauguration ceremony, at which Wang further emphasised the partnership with Japan, saying:

China must maintain her independence, her sovereignty, her national freedom before she can carry out principles of good neighbourliness, a common anti-Comintern front and economic co-operation and further share the responsibility for building up a new order in East Asia. (NYT 31 March 1940)

Note that Wang not only calls for peaceful co-existence between China and Japan, but also with “all friendly powers” and particularly in East Asia. When the machinery of a global war among industrialised countries was wreaking havoc at an unprecedented speed and scale, such an appeal went unheeded, verging on the utopian, if not hypocritical.

Later that year, in a speech delivered on 12 November 1940, commemorating Sun Yat-sen’s 74th birthday and entitled “Nationalism and Pan-Asianism” (“Minzu zhuyi yu Da Yazhou zhuyi” 民族主義與大亞洲主義), Wang weaves the three credos of his life—Nationalism, Human-Co-Existentialism, and Pan-Asianism—into a single ideological mantle. As he declares, nationalism is the means to awaken the Chinese nation’s self-consciousness and to rally its solidarity, while Pan-Asianism is the means to awaken the East Asian peoples’ self-consciousness and to rally their solidarity. The ultimate goal is to unite all peoples in the world who treat each other as equal in order to fight against colonialism and chauvinism, so that the Yellow Race will not suffer the same fate as the Indians in America, the Brown aborigines in Australia, or the Blacks in Africa. In this sense, Wang’s Pan-Asianism is China’s nationalism writ large, or Human-Co-Existentialism writ small. Then, he further proclaims that, since, in the current world, even strong countries need to unite with others to survive, given China’s weakness, she certainly needs to unite with others. Japan, being a strong country sharing the same culture and belonging to the same race, is the best candidate.⁴⁵

What Wang fails to mention is China’s cultural superiority, or even its uniqueness, which had previously driven his nationalist passion. China is now a weak nation among many, even though, culturally and racially, she bears much

45 Published on multiple journals funded by Wang’s regime; see, e.g. Wang Jingwei 1940, “Min-zuzhiyu yu da Yazhou zhuyi. for an English translation, see Saaler. Sven and Christopher W. A. Szpilman (2011), *Pan-Asianism: A Documented History*, vol. 2, pp. 213–215.

affinity to her strong neighbour, Japan, on whom her survival depends. Why she deserves to survive is hard for Wang to justify, except, perhaps, for the fact that, as a Chinese nationalist, he has no choice but to wish her the best.

Whether Wang Jingwei truly believed in Japan's good will, we cannot say. We do know that, in the previous incarnations of his life, he repeatedly denounced Japan as China's most dangerous and devious enemy. That he suddenly became naïve would defy logic. Moreover, unlike his earlier well-argued essays, his endorsement of Pan-Asianism was voiced in much shorter speeches given at formal and undoubtedly closely-watched occasions, without sophisticated reasoning. Another curious fact is that, unlike his previous intellectual persuasions, which were expounded not only in his essays and speeches, but also in his poetry—a much more intimate genre, this last incarnation of Wang as a Pan-Asianist finds no lyrical evidence. In effect, the vision of the world that he evokes in his later poetry is not an Asia happily united under a rising sun, but havoc, carnage, and universal destruction, an Armageddon to which he must sacrifice his own life, as our previous analysis of his firewood metaphor also suggests. The identification of his person with the body of the nation is most explicitly revealed in a song-lyric, “A River Full of Red” (“Manjianghong” 滿江紅),⁴⁶ written in 1940 in Nanjing. As he wrote, towards the end of the song:

邦殄更無身可贖、時危未許心能白。但一成一旅起從頭、無遺力。

When the nation extinguishes, no person is left to be ransomed;
the moment of crisis forbids me to reveal my heart.
With just one village, one brigade, I start from the beginning,
with no reserve.

The tune pattern “A River Full of Red” was associated with a patriotic song attributed to the Southern Song hero Yue Fei 岳飛 (1103–1142), which expresses his resolution to recover the lost northern territories. Wang was often compared to Qin Hui 秦檜 (1090–1155), a traitor in historical legend who schemed to kill Yue Fei—in effect, after Wang had fled Chongqing, many Chinese cities erected two statues in his and Chen Bijun's likeness to receive people's spite, evoking the kneeling statues of Qin Hui and his wife in a temple dedicated to Yue Fei.⁴⁷ Wang's decision to put words to this tune could therefore be read as a gesture of protest and self-defence. Yet, the last two couplets, as cited above, raise intriguing questions about taboo and self-revelation. He declares “the moment of crisis forbids me to reveal my heart”, hinting at a possible discrepancy between his public pronouncements and his private convictions. To the future readers of his poetry, he tries to reveal his purportedly gen-

46 Wang Jingwei (2012), *Shuangzhaolon shicigao*, p. 310.

47 See Lin Kuo (2001), *Wang Jingwei quanzhuan*, p.400.

uine motive: although he did not defend China on the battlefield as Yue Fei did, he was defending her on another front.

Coda

In his “Autography” (“Zishu” 自述) published in *The Eastern Miscellany* (*Dongfang zazhi* 東方雜誌) in January, 1934, Wang declares:

It is the most authentic to take one’s speeches and treatises, given or written throughout one’s life, as one’s autobiography—there is no need for me to write another autobiography.

Yet, on his deathbed in a Nagoya hospital in November 1944, Wang reportedly announced that there would be no need to collect his essays, as his poetry alone would be his testament.⁴⁸ Indeed, an editorial committee consisting of his loyal associates duly compiled and published his poetry anthology entitled *Poetry on the Double-Shining Tower* (*Shuangzhaolou shici gao* 雙照樓詩詞藁) in 1945, just before Japan’s surrender. It implies that, between 1934 and 1944, Wang changed his mind about what type of writing was one’s most authentic autobiography. As Wang was considered the nation’s foremost literatus-statesman, prior to 1939, his speeches and writings had been periodically collected and published, so what was left uncollected were only those after his collaboration with Japan. To sympathetic readers, it indicates that Wang considered the writings from his last stage of life to be disingenuous, perhaps a source of remorse and shame. To unsympathetic readers, it is evidence of Wang’s effort to manipulate his posthumous memory. The critics do have a point: if Wang had been an steadfast believer of Wang Yangming’s idealist philosophy, wishing to sacrifice his life for the ultimate good without any thought of salvaging his own reputation, then he had failed in his most lofty goal. His poetry, while trying to preserve a man’s private memory of his life, betrays his lingering attachment to eternal glory, thus raising further questions about performance, self-persuasion, authenticity, and autobiographical writing. In other words, even if we accept all of Wang’s self-proclamations as authentic, the literary success of his poetry was, at the same time, his moral failure.

Yet, if the reader is already so forgiving, he or she may detect, in Wang’s moral failure to reconcile, with the enemy, a certain tenacity to preserve one’s sense of moral subjectivity in the most unlikely situations, a paradoxical symbol of the weakness and strength of China’s cultural tradition. As Wang had argued

48 See Jin Xiongbai (1959–65), *Wang Zhengquan de kaichang yu shouchang*, vol. 5, p.124; Lin Kuo (2001), *Wang Jingwei quanzhuan*, p., 750.

in his early essays promoting a nationalism based upon the Han cultural superiority, despite repeated conquests in history, the Chinese cultural community always perceived itself the ultimate victor, surviving and even expanding its influence over time. The culture's military weakness is thus its civil strength. Wang himself embodied this very feature. Arguably, he was China's last literatus-statesman. Compared to other national leaders in the Republican era or after 1949, he not only had received the full curriculum of classical education, but was also versed in traditional literati arts such as poetry, calligraphy, and painting. He also insisted on embodying the civil tradition of statecraft by refusing to build up his own military or financial powers. Rather, his cultural capital was his political capital, and his repeated retreats from politics embodied the value of eremitism in traditional Chinese political philosophy. But now he faced the futility of this cultural-political tradition in the era of military build-up powered by modern science and technology.

As a politician, Wang's idealism had a pragmatic side. The realist and cosmopolitan in him was forced to acknowledge the strengths of other civilisations, which, at the present stage of history, appeared to have left the Chinese far behind. Yet, born Chinese, he had no choice but to keep on working on the self-strengthening agenda of nation-building—but it needed time. When Japanese aggression threatened to destroy China, or, at least, throw it into domestic chaos, which might ultimately benefit a universalist doctrine, namely, Communism, Wang's only source of strength was his belief in his moral self. As Wang Yangming argued, by expanding one's moral knowledge, heeding to no reward, not even the reward of reputation, one would bring peace to All-under-Heaven. Wang responded to the doctrine by working with the enemy—wishing to convert its heart, and, if not, at least becoming a protector of the people in the occupied zone, bidding for time, and waiting for China's recovery, even if it would be a recovery without him. And in this sense, the failure of his collaborationist regime became, again, his ultimate success.

As a follower of his reported in a post-war memoir, when the news of Pearl Harbor came, Wang realised that Japan's days were numbered; he told his eldest son:

If China could still be saved, I only hope that my life and reputation be both ruined, and our family be broken and laced with tragedies. Be prepared. You should have enough courage to welcome this future fate.⁴⁹

It implies that, only in the ruins of his regime, his life, and his reputation, could a post-war China recover under a common memory of united resistance. The mainstream historiography, even if the justice that it metes is that of the victor's, can be said to have simply fulfilled Wang's wish. His poetry, however,

49 Jin Xiongbai (1959–65), *Wang Zhengquan de kaichang yu shouchang*, vol. 2, p 104.

leaves a tiny refuge for a counter memory and for future redemption in a world that Wang had only dreamt of—one that is dominated not by nationalism, but by human-co-existentialism; one that is yet to come.

Bibliography

Archives

KMT-Party Archive, Taipei

Books and Articles

- Anderson, Benedict (1983), *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso Books.
- Arendt, Hannah (1951). *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Penguin Classics (rpt. 2017).
- Brook, Timothy (2012), “Hesitating before the Judgment of History”, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 71: 1, pp. 103–14.
- Florian, Jean Pierre Claris de (1855). *Fables de Florian*. Paris: Delarue.
- Huang Tao 黃濤 (2013). “Yuansha: Qingmo gemingpai ansha yanjiu” 原殺：清末革命派暗殺研究 (On the Origin of Killing: A Study of the Assassinations by Revolutionaries toward the End of the Qing), East China Normal University MA Thesis.
- Jishou 旣首 trans. (1908). “Diwang ansha zhi shidai” 帝王暗殺之時代, *Minbao* 民報 (The People’s Journal), 21, pp. 80–85.
- Jin Xiongbai 金雄白 (1959–1965), *Wang Zhengquan de kaichang yu shouchang* 汪政權的開場與收場 (Beginning and End of the Wang [Jingwei] Regime), Hong Kong: Chunqiu zazhishe, 1959–65.
- Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1896 [1999]), “Lun bianfa bi zi ping Man Han zhi jie shi” 論變法必自平滿漢之界始 (Reform must Start with Levelling the Differences between Manchus and Han), in: *Liang Qichao quanji*, Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, pp. 51–54.
- (1897 [1999]), “Chunqiu Zhongguo Yi Di bian xu” 春秋中國夷狄辨序 (Preface to The Distinction between the Chinese and the Barbarians in the Spring and Autumn Period), in: *Liang Qichao quanji* 梁啟超全集 (Complete Works of Liang Qichao), Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, pp. 124–25.
- (1900 [1999]), “Zhongguo jiru suo yuan lun” 中國積弱溯源論 (On the Origins of China’s Accumulated Weakness), *Liang Qichao quanji*, Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, pp. 412–27.
- (1902a [1999]), “Lun minzu jingzheng zhi dashi” 論民族競爭之大勢 (On the General Situation Regarding the Competition between Nations), in: *Liang Qichao quanji*, Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, pp. 887–99.
- (1902b [1899]), “Xinmin shuo” 新民說 (On Renewing the People), in: *Liang Qichao quanji*, Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, pp. 655–735.
- (1905 [1999]), “Kaiming zhuanzhi lun” 開明專制論 (On Enlightened Autocracy), in: *Liang Qichao quanji*, Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, pp. 1470–86.

- Lin Kuo 林闊 (2001), *Wang Jingwei quanzhuan* 汪精衛全傳 (Complete Biography of Wang Jingwei), Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe.
- Luo Haoxing 羅皓星 (2015), “1900 niandai zhongguo de zhengzhi ansha jiqi shehui xiaoying” 1900年代中國的政治暗殺及其社會效應 (Political Assassinations and Their Social Effects in 1900s China), *Zhengda shicui* 政大史粹, 28, pp. 153–99.
- Saaler, Sven, and Christopher W.A. Szpilman (eds) (2011), *Pan-Asianism: A Documented History*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing.
- Sima Qian 司馬遷 (1959). *Shiji* 史記 (Records of the Grand Historian), Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.
- Sun Yat-sen 孫中山 (1981a), “Dui Shenhu shangyehuiyisuo deng tuanti de yanshuo” 對神戶商業會議所等團體的演說 (Speeches towards Merchants, Guilds and other groups in Kobe), in *Sun Zhongshan quanji* 孫中山全集 (Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen), Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, vol.11, pp. 401–09.
- (1981b [1924]), “Sanmin zhuyi, minsheng zhuyi” 三民主義·民生主義 (The Three Principles of the People, Welfare of the People)(3 August 1924), in *Sun Zhongshan quanji*, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, vol. 9, p. 355.
- Wang Jingwei 汪精衛 (1927), “Zenyangde jinian Zongli yanjiangci” 怎樣的紀念總理演講詞 (How to Remember Our Former Prime Minister [Sun Yat-sen]), in *Wang Jingwei yanjiang lu* (Hankou: Zhongguo yinshuguan, 1927), p. 119.
- (1929a), “Geming keyi dujue guafen zhi shiju” 革命可以杜絕瓜分之實據 (Evidence that Revolution can Help to Prevent being Sliced up like a Melon), in: *Wang Jingwei ji*, Shanghai: Guangming shuju, pp. 171–96.
- (1929b), “Geming zhi juexin” 革命之決心 (Resolution for Revolution), in: *Wang Jingwei ji*, Shanghai: Guangming shuju, pp. 91–98.
- (1929c), “Minzu de guomin” 民族的國民 (National citizens), in *Wang Jingwei ji*, Shanghai: Guangming shuju, no.1: 1–30; no.2: 31–52.
- (1929d), “Wuhan fengong zhi jingguo” 武漢分共之經過 (Report on Separating from the Communists at Wuhan), in: *Wang Jingwei ji*, Shanghai: Guangming shuju, pp. 215–27.
- (1929e), “Xuanbu Sun Zongli shilue yanjiangci” 宣佈孫總理事略演講詞 (Speech on Prime Minister Sun’s Deeds), in: *Wang Jingwei ji*, Shanghai: Guangming shuju, p. 121.
- (1929f), “Yu Hu Hanmin shu” 與胡漢民書 (Letter to Hu Hanmin), *Wang Jingwei ji*, Shanghai: Guangming shuju, p. 82.
- (1940), “Minzuzhuyi yu Da Yazhou zhuyi” 民族主義與大亞洲主義 (Nationalism and Pan-Asianism), *Xianzheng yuekan* 憲政月刊, 1:3: pp. 3–5.
- (2012a), “Beidai kouzhan” 被逮口占 (Orally Composed upon Being Captured), in: Wang Mengchuan 汪夢川 (ed.), *Shuangzhaolou shici gao* 雙照樓詩詞稿 (Poetry on the Double-Shining Tower), Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu chubanshe.
- (2012b), “Bingru shoushu Yangming xiansheng ‘Da Nie Wenwei shu’ [...]” 冰如手書陽明先生答聶文蔚書 [...]. (Bingru [Chen Bijun] Hand-wrote the Epistle by Wang Yangming to Nie Wenwei), in: Wang Mengchuan (ed.), *Shuangzhaolou shici gao*, Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu chubanshe, p. 285.
- (2012c), “Jian ren xi chelun wei xin wei zuo ci ge” 見人析車輪為薪為作此歌 (Song Written Upon Seeing People Chopping a Wheel into Firewood), in: Wang Mengchuan (ed.), *Shuangzhaolou shici gao*, Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu chubanshe, p. 22.

- (2012d), “Yinduyang zhou zhong” 印度洋舟中 (In a Boat Amid the Indian Ocean), Wang Mengchuan (ed.), *Shuangzhaolou shici gao*, Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu chubanshe, p. 44.
- Wang Yangming 王陽明(2000), *Yangming chuanxi lu* 陽明傳習錄 (Records of Yang-ming’s Teaching). Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe.
- Xian Yuhao 鮮于浩 (2016). *Liu Fa qingong jiansue yundong shi* 留法勤工儉學運動史 (History of the Diligent Work-Frugal Study Program in France). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe.
- Yang, Zhiyi (2015), “Road to Lyric Martyrdom: Reading the Poetry of Wang Zhaoming (1883–1944),” *Chinese Literature: Essays, Articles, Reviews*, 37, pp. 139–40.
- (2018). “A Humanist in Wartime France: Wang Jingwei during the First World War,” *Poetica*, forthcoming.
- Yuan Ke 袁珂 (1980), *Shanhaijing jiaozhu* 山海經校注 (Commented Version of the *Shanhai jing*), Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe.
- Zhang Binglin 章炳麟 (1985), “Bo Kang Youwei lun geming shu” 駁康有為論革命書 (Refutation of Kang Youwei on Revolution), in: *Zhang Taiyan quanji* 章太炎全集 (Complete Works of Zhang Taiyan [Binglin]), Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1985, vol. 4, pp. 173–84.
- Zhang Jiangcai 張江裁 (1937), “Wang Jingwei xiansheng gengxu mengnan shilu” 汪精衛先生庚戌蒙難實錄 (Faithful Record on Mr. Wang Jingwei’s Suffering in 1910), *Yuefeng* 越風, 2 (3), pp. 13–16.